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Abstract
This article focuses attention on the efforts by army officials, peers, politicians, academics, religious 
leaders and supportive British Muslims to include Muslims from the past and present in the UK 2014 
Centenary Commemorations. Through insights from critical military studies I argue that these sites 
of memorialisation represent complex, multi-layered forms of militarisation that garner support 
for war and reveal the shifting boundaries of inclusion and exclusion in the national community. 
As well as the advocates of these initiatives, I also analyse statements made by British Muslim 
opponents of the Poppy Hijab, revealing the contested nature of militarism in society.
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Since 2014, the UK has been commemorating and celebrating the Centenary of the First World 
War (WWI). Every year, commemorations take place around Armistice Day in Britain and other 
Commonwealth countries to honour the sacrifice of all who have suffered or died in war. During these 
events, the poppy is sold by veteran’s charities to raise money for the armed forces community. The 
poppy is an iconic emblem of British collective remembrance of military sacrifice which has been 
promoted nationally by the veterans’ charity, the Royal British Legion, since 1921. During the 2014 
Centenary Commemorations, army officials, peers, politicians, academics, religious leaders and 
supportive British Muslims have spent considerable energy on highlighting the contribution that 
Muslims have made to the British military throughout history. The legacy of the ‘forgotten army’ of 
400,000 Muslim soldiers who fought for Britain during WWI has been revived after it was revealed 
that only 22% of the British public knew of their sacrifice (Lockley, 2016). Moreover, the memory 
of Khudadad Khan, the first Muslim to be awarded the Victoria Cross (the highest accolade of the 
UK’s honours system) in 1914, has been unearthed in a number of official commemorative settings. 
This memorialisation of Muslim soldiers has been done in conjunction with a series of initiatives to 
include contemporary British Muslims in the commemorations, including the creation of the Poppy 
Hijab. The Poppy Hijab combines the Islamic headdress, the hijab, with a poppy motif, giving British 
Muslim women the opportunity to join in on the Remembrance events. It was supported by a range 
of veteran’s charities, think-tanks, army officials, Muslim models and elements of the right-wing 
press, including The Daily Mail (Doyle, 2014) and The Telegraph (Sanghani, 2015). However, the 
Poppy Hijab has also been divisive and some Muslim women have publicly voiced their opposition 
to the symbol (Hooper, 2014; Ahmed, 2015).
This article will argue that these sites of memorialisation represent complex, multi-layered forms of 
militarisation that garner support for war and reveal the shifting boundaries of inclusion and exclusion 
in the national community. To demonstrate my argument, I will combine insights from critical 
military studies with literature concerned with the construction of identity through memorialisation. 
There are two main insights from critical military studies that I will use in this article. First, I will use 
scholarly work concerned with the ways in which military power interacts with the boundaries of 
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national identity. Second, I will use Vron Ware’s concept of militarised multiculture to understand 
the military’s motivations behind involving Muslims in the Centenary Commemorations. However, 
in order to apply militarised multiculture to the Centenary Commemorations, I will interweave 
this concept with literature on memorialisation and identity to draw attention to how militarised 
multiculture is being reinforced through sites of memorialisation.
Critical military studies is a field of inquiry concerned with military power in all its manifestations. 
Critical military scholars insist on remaining ‘sceptically curious’ about military power (Enloe, 2015, 
7) and emphasise that we should not take its ‘character, representation, application and effects’ for 
granted (Basham et. al, 2015, 1). Importantly, critical military studies challenge the tendency among 
dominant traditional military studies to conceptualise the civilian and military realms as separate 
spheres. In contrast, critical military scholars claim that the boundaries between the civilian and 
military domains are blurred (ibid.). This critical literature shares similarities with scholarship that has 
begun to think about militarism and international relations in ‘sociological’ terms; a phenomenon 
that is sustained and contested through social practices by actors at all levels of society (Stavrianakis, 
2015; Shaw, 2012). Militarism, by this logic, is understood as a multi-layered and complex form of 
power.
For critical military scholars, the militarisation of the boundaries of national identity describes 
the process in which militaries are resituated at the centre of national life (Ware, 2012a, 279). 
Militarisation involves the ‘encroaching of military forms, personnel and practices upon civilian 
institutions or social orders’ (Otley 1978: 322). Critical military scholars shed light on processes 
of militarisation to acknowledge how military values, institutions, preferences and norms become 
embedded and normalised in society, presenting militarism and war ‘as necessary and natural 
extensions of nation states’ civil society’ (Kelly, 2012 723). In this sense, the preparation for war 
is as important as the conduct of war for critical military scholars. As Woodward (2005, 727) has 
written, conflict constitutes ‘the endpoint of processes, practices, ideas and arguments which make 
it possible. Armed conflict is only possible if a whole host of things fall into place’. Britain provides 
a particularly important case-study for critical military studies as the UK’s deployment of troops 
overseas has always been an important and legitimate means of achieving foreign and security 
policy aims (Fey, 2012, 47). Since 1991, the UK has militarily intervened in Bosnia, Iraq, Kosovo, 
Macedonia, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and Libya. Only the United States has used its military more 
often in the service of foreign policy goals (Gaskarth, 2016, 105).
Importantly, scholars have emphasised militarisation to be an exclusionary process. Qureshi and 
Zeitlyn (2012) have described how in the process of mobilising militarism during the War on Terror, 
Britain forged and consolidated a militaristic national identity in contradistinction to the Muslim 
‘Other’. This construction of the Muslim identity as the ‘enemy within’ has been made easier under 
a generalising narrative that presumes Muslims to be inherently risky and a threat to Britain’s ‘way of 
life’ (Qureshi & Zeitlyn, 2012, 4). Since the beginning of the War on Terror, British Muslims have been 
disproportionately targeted by a series of security measures that use race as a frame of reference for 
expulsions, incarcerations, surveillance, policing and repression (Pitcher, 2009). Moreover, the media 
has played a central role in perpetuating this discourse, fostering suspicion and hostility in British 
society towards Muslims. Against this background of exclusionary militarisation, the complexity 
of the relationship between British Muslims, the armed forces and British identity is brought into 
sharp focus. In an environment of suspicion and hostility surrounding Muslims, British Muslims 
have been drawing on military institutions and symbols during the Centenary Commemoration 
to authenticate their British identity and prove that ‘not all Muslims are extremists’. However, for 
some Muslims, incorporation into the fold of Britishness is contingent upon their conformance 
with particular configurations of British identity (Ware, 2010a, 315-6). Moreover, as militarisation 
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has been predicated on the exclusion of Muslims, the limited modes of inclusion into the national 
community are relatively precarious for Muslims and are always able to be called into question 
(ibid.).
To explain the military’s motivations to include Muslims from the past and present in the Centenary 
Commemorations, I will use Vron Ware’s notion of militarised multiculture. The concept, militarised 
multiculture, is Ware’s most important contribution to the literature understanding the military’s 
recruitment of ethnic minorities. Due to legal requirements and allegations of institutional racism, 
the armed forces have been recruiting ethnic minorities since the 1990s. Militarised multiculture 
explains how a visibly diverse army plays a key role in projecting a particular image of Britishness 
(Ware, 2012a, 256). Ware claims that a visibly diverse and progressive image of the armed forces 
reinforces militarisation in at least three ways. First, it works as a recruitment strategy to attract more 
ethnic minorities to join the forces. Second, it helps build support for unpopular foreign policies 
(Ware, 2012a, 279). Lastly, it conceals the endemic nature of institutional racism in the military and, 
more broadly, structural racism built into the fabric of postcolonial British society (ibid.).
However, there is a gap in Ware’s work in connection to sites of memorialisation. Thus, in order 
to complete this article’s theoretical framework I will bring in literature on memorialisation to 
demonstrate how militarised multiculture operates through sites of remembrance. Memorialisation 
is the process by which collectives remember and reflect on memories of the past. Jay Winter 
(2006) has written about how sites of remembrance and shared loss are pivotal in informing a 
shared sense of national identity. During the 2014 Centenary Commemorations, Britain’s sense 
of being a tolerant, diverse and liberal nation has been informed by the memorialisation of the 
Muslim soldiers’ sacrifice from WWI. According to Bongiorno (2014, 97), multicultural memories 
of military history mobilise a pluralistic notion of what constitutes the defence of the nation. One 
key argument of this article is that in sites of remembrance the strategic representation of ethnic 
minorities, as noted under militarised multiculture, is being reinforced through memorialisation. I 
will demonstrate how progressive values are being interwoven with Britain’s military history, giving 
historical and virtuous legitimacy to contemporary processes of militarisation. By mobilising the 
memory of the Muslim soldiers’ sacrifice from WWI, participants in the Centenary Commemorations 
are lending historical legitimacy to multilayered processes of militarisation.
The role of memory is also important for actors during the Centenary Commemorations who 
challenge the military’s dominant historical narrative. The initiative of the Poppy Hijab, which I 
will focus on in the end of this article, has polarised opinion amongst British Muslims. Those who 
publicly reject the Poppy Hijab bring a number of things to light about militarism. For one, their 
opposition demonstrates the complexity and contested nature of militarism. However, the fear 
amongst these Muslims of being branded a ‘traitor’ or, worse, an ‘extremist’ for rejecting military 
institutions reveals how the Muslim identity has been externalised during the War on Terror as the 
boundaries and patterns of Britishness have been drawn along military lines. Moreover, by offering 
an alternative story of events, these actors are disrupting the idea that Britain’s wars have been 
waged to promote values of diversity and liberty. Their counter-narrative tells a concealed history 
of racial discrimination of Muslims, which in recent years has been heightened under processes of 
militarisation during the War on Terror.
This article will be split into two main theoretical and empirical sections. To begin, I will outline 
my conceptual framework provided by insights from critical military studies and the literature 
surrounding memorialisation and identity. This section is split into four subsections. First, I will trace 
how the boundaries of British identity have been militarised during the War on Terror. This includes 
examples of the increasing presence of the military in civil-society and the equally important role 
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British society has played in (re)producing militarism. Moreover, scholars emphasising the banality 
of militarism will provide insights into how we can understand the Centenary Commemorations as 
sites of militarisation. Second, I will deal with the exclusion of the Muslim identity under processes 
of militarisation. The available modes of inclusion and exclusion open to Muslims during the War 
on Terror will provide ideas of how Muslims can exhibit particular configurations of British identity 
or risk coming under suspicion as an ‘enemy’ or a ‘threat’. Additionally, it will be important to 
emphasise the UK right-wing media’s role in these exclusionary dynamics because of their positive 
coverage of the Centenary Commemorations which I will cover in the empirical section. Under the 
third subsection, I will outline Vron Ware’s important concept of militarised multiculture. This will 
be central to understanding the military’s motivations to involve Muslims during the Centenary 
Commemorations. Finally, in the last section, ideas about memorialisation and identity formation 
in sites of remembrance will be sketched out. These insights will allow me to demonstrate how 
militarised multiculture can be stretched through time through the mobilisation of multicultural 
memories of British military history.
In the empirical section, I will analyse statements surrounding the 2014 Centenary Commemorations 
made by public officials, academics and Muslims online and in the media. The combination of Vron 
Ware’s notion of militarised multiculture and ideas about memorialisation and identity will be used 
in the analysis. The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate my argument that sites of memorialisation 
represent complex, multi-layered forms of militarisation that garner support for war and reveal the 
shifting boundaries of inclusion and exclusion in the national community.
The Militarisation of British Identity
This section will outline how the boundaries of British identity have been militarised during the War 
on Terror. The close connection between national identity and military service is a long standing 
Western tradition. As Krebs (2006: 16) affirms, throughout history military institutions have been 
‘shapers of nations’. This connection between national identity and militarism becomes most visible 
in times of war when the military and public support is mobilised behind the state. As with all wars, 
states look to build and consolidate a unitary and coherent national identity in order to sustain 
support for their efforts (Robinson, 2012).
During Britain’s wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the military was re-situated at the centre of British 
national life (Ware, 2010b, 1). As public support for the wars began to wane, the UK government 
and military embarked upon a considerable project of militarisation to increase the presence of the 
military in British society. In a 2008 ‘Report of Inquiry into National Recognition of our Armed Forces’, 
the government and armed forces set out ‘to identify ways of encouraging greater understanding 
and appreciation of the Armed Forces by the British public’ (MoD, 2008, 28). Recommendations 
included increasing visibility of the armed forces–including wider use of uniforms in civilian areas – 
and improving contact between the military and civil society including public outreach programmes 
intended to build understanding and encourage support (MoD, 2008, 6-14).
Subsequently, the government created Armed Forces Day in 2009 as an annual celebration to 
celebrate the service of men and women in the British military. The military has also been used 
in unconventional settings such as providing strike cover for fire-fighters, standing in for private 
security contractors at the London Olympics in 2012, providing school citizenship classes and 
paramilitary leisure activities such as boot-camp fitness training (Basham, 2016a, 11). There have 
also been calls for the reintroduction of national military service to tackle youth knife and gun crime 
(ibid.). During the London 2012 Olympics, after the failure of a private security company to acquire 
Contemporary Voices, Volume 1, Issue 1 - April 2018 54
a large enough workforce, military personnel were deployed to provide security for the event in the 
biggest ever peacetime operation to protect UK airspace (Booth & Hopkins, 2012).
The military has also increased its presence in educational environments. Dubbed by critics as the 
‘militarisation of education’, the armed forces predominantly target schools in working class areas 
of the UK, seeking to recruit youngsters (Sangster, 2012). Revealingly, military personnel make 
around 11,000 visits to secondary schools and colleges in the UK each year (ibid.). Moreover, since 
2011 the government has spent over £45 million on education initiatives promoting a ‘military 
ethos’ in schools and £50 million to expand cadet forces in state schools (Forces Watch, 2015).
Misleadingly, the term militarisation ‘often implies something being done to society by the military’ 
(Basham, 2016a, 11). However, it is important to emphasise that military values, norms, preferences 
and institutions are embedded (and contested) by supporting actors in civil society as much as 
by ‘top down’ military pressure (Bernazzoli & Flint, 2009). ‘Militarism’, Basham (2016a, 11) rightly 
stresses, ‘is not imposed’. In regards to sites of remembrance, the commemorative events in the UK 
town Wootton Bassett in 2007 provide a clear example of British society’s participation in processes 
of militarisation through sites of memorialisation. In 2007, repatriated soldiers killed during the 
war in Iraq were transported through the UK town of Wootton Bassett. After a few months, these 
repatriations garnered attention in the town and spontaneous gatherings of up to a 1,000 people 
began to line the streets during the year to pay their respects to the dead soldiers. For critical 
military scholars Jenkings et. al (2012, 357), the unchoreographed and mature ways in which these 
crowds gathered to show their respect served as a clear example of how ‘militarism is a process that 
also entails non-state actors behaving in non-orchestrated ways’.
For Bernazzoli and Flint (2009, 398) it is the ‘banality’ of militarism, in the sense of its (re)production 
in everyday practices and routines, which makes it so powerful. Quotidian celebrations of military 
institutions and values make militarism ‘more than merely an elite ideology, or a set of beliefs 
with which state institutions indoctrinate the less powerful sectors of society’ (Bernazzoli & Flint, 
2009, 398). This includes the intrusion and acceptance of military symbols in popular culture. 
For instance, Vron Ware has noted how ‘the figure of the solider is ubiquitous throughout the 
[British] media, constantly visible in news, military bulletins, films, digital games, forums, art and 
photography’ (Ware, 2012b, 11). This diffuseness of militarism helps to normalise the military’s 
presence, presenting militarism and war ‘as necessary and natural extensions of nation states’ civil 
society’ (Kelly, 2012, 723). In regards to the suggestion that Muslim women should wear the Poppy 
Hijab we can see that this critical literature is useful for understanding how something as banal as 
wearing a commemorative piece of clothing can be a form of militarisation. The poppy, as an iconic 
symbol of British collective remembrance of military sacrifice (Basham 2016b), offers an example 
of how everyday interactions between people and military institutions can help to organise public 
spaces and people’s bodies in accordance with military interests. In similar fashion, opponents of 
the Poppy Hijab can be understood as opponents of militarism. Their rejection of military symbols 
illuminates how militarism is a form of power that is multilayered, contested and constantly evolving.
Militarisation and the Muslim Identity
Pivotal to this article’s discussion of the relationship between Muslims and the British armed forces, 
it is important to understand militarisation as an exclusionary process. In the process of mobilising 
militarism at home during the War on Terror, a militaristic British national identity has been forged 
and consolidated in contradistinction to the Muslim ‘Other’ (Qureshi & Zeitlyn, 2012). Notably, the 
contours of inclusion and exclusion under militarisation are constantly shifting. The ‘Other’ is not a 
fixed and immutable category, but is ‘reformulated according to political circumstances as they vary 
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over time’ (Roberts, 2004, 728). This explains how Muslim communities have been identified as the 
‘new’ suspect community during the War on Terror whilst previously demonised groups such as the 
Irish community have been re-included into the fold of Britishness (Pantazis & Pemberton, 2009).
This transformation of Muslims into the mould of the ‘enemy within’ occurred, in part, through a 
range of security measures implemented to counter the threat of terrorism in Britain. The threat 
of ‘home-grown’ terrorism came to be acknowledged by UK authorities after it was revealed that 
three of the four bombers involved in the 7/7 terrorist attacks in London in 2005 were British-born 
males of Pakistani immigrants. However, under a generalising narrative that presumes Muslims to 
be inherently risky and a threat to Britain’s ‘way of life’, these security measures disproportionately 
targeted Muslim people by using race as a frame of reference for expulsions, incarcerations, 
surveillance, policing and repression (Pitcher, 2009). In the initial stages of the war, the security 
services systematically built up ‘widespread intelligence about particular groups or communities 
deemed potential security risks’, rather than specifically targeting activities against individuals with 
demonstrable links to terrorist organisations such as Al Qaida (Fekete, 2004, 8). At each juncture of 
the Terrorism Act 2000, with amendments made in 2001, 2005 and 2006, the definition of terrorist 
offences and the police’s powers expanded (Klausen, 2009, 404). Under the Anti-Terrorism Act, which 
granted the Home Secretary increased powers to outlaw suspect foreign terrorist groups operating 
within the UK, 31 out of 40 proscribed described themselves as mainly Islamic in inspiration (Birt, 
2006, 695-6). By September 2004, 664 persons, nearly all of whom were Muslims, had been taken 
into detention without trial under anti-terrorism legislation (Modood, 2006, 47). Moreover, Muslims 
were disproportionately targeted in the upsurge of police stop-and-searches. Between 2001–02 
and 2003–04 there was a 393 percent rise in stop-and-searches of Asians and Asian people were 
stopped nearly twice the frequency between 2003–04 and 2005–06 (Pitcher, 2009, 148). The result 
of this racially framed security policy is that by merely ‘belonging to a particular community or 
group is, in itself, a security threat’ (Fekete, 2004, 8).
In the UK, a racially charged narrative that demonised ‘cultural representations’ of Muslims and 
Islam ran alongside these security measures (Amin-Khan, 2010). In this narrative, Muslims have been 
aligned with ‘backwardness’ and ‘barbarism’; a people ‘obsessed with praying, veiling, intolerance 
towards others, demands for special treatment, regularly testing the tolerance and goodwill of 
‘host’ countries’ (Williamson & Khiabany, 2010, 86). This discourse, propagated in the media and 
by public officials, has homogenised all Islamic people as one, monolithic group. Islamic culture 
is constructed as static, immutable, fixed and cabined whilst ‘pluralisms, contests and dissent that 
exist within the tradition’ are closed off (Kapur, 2002, 217). These cultural representations have been 
key to the War on Terror, confirming the ways in which this discourse permeates through different 
levels of militarisation. This is connected to the ways in which the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have 
been justified in language reminiscent of Britain’s colonial era, with an ‘enlightened’ Western realm 
seeking to ‘save’ Muslims from ‘barbaric savages’ (Mutua, 2001). This narrative works to reinforce 
militarism by formulating the War on Terror into a Manichean format of ‘good’ versus ‘evil’. Moreover, 
as Edward Said (1997, xxii) has written, the central role of the nation in producing sentiments 
of alienation amongst minority communities (e.g. through security measures) is eradicated in this 
exclusionary discourse:
‘much of what one reads and sees about Islam… represents the aggression as coming 
from Islam because that is what “Islam” is. Local and concrete circumstances are thus 
obliterated. In other words, covering Islam is a one-sided activity that obscures what 
“we” do, and highlights instead what Muslims and Arabs by their very flawed nature are’.
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The British right-wing media (including The Daily Mail, The Sun and The Telegraph) has played a 
central role in perpetuating this narrative. Tellingly, in a report by the European Council against 
Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) in 2016, the UK’s right-wing press was damned for using ‘offensive, 
discriminatory and provocative terminology’ in relation to Muslims (Dearden, 2016). Moreover, 
in 2017 British media organisations were forced to retract and correct a ‘consistent stream’ of 
inaccurate and misrepresentative stories in the news which predominantly associated Muslims with 
violence and extremism (Sherwood, 2017). It is worth noting the powerful influence which the right-
wing media has on British political and social discourse. The Daily Mail, The Sun and The Telegraph 
are amongst the most read newspapers in both print and online in the UK (Ponsford, 2015). Indeed, 
according to a 2016 poll by YouGov, the British press is said to be the ‘most right-wing in Europe’ 
(Dahlgreen, 2016).
In this context of exclusion, how have Muslims been expected to integrate during the War on 
Terror? Crucially, the construction of the Muslim ‘enemy within’ contains within it an important 
dichotomy that distinguishes between ‘moderate’ and ‘extremist’ Muslims. As Mamdani (2002, 
766) has written, after 9-11 the discourse surrounding Muslims shifted from one associated with 
Samuel Huntington’s famous Clash of Civilisations theory, which ‘demonized Islam in its entirety’, 
to a more moderated discourse which distinguished between ‘good Muslims’ and ‘bad Muslims’. 
By the same token, this good/bad Muslim dichotomy is similarly expressed in the notion of the 
‘moderate’ versus the ‘extremist’ Muslim. For instance, in 2006 Michael Gove (2006), the ex-
Secretary of State for Justice, wrote in The Guardian newspaper that the government should do 
more to ‘engage with moderate Muslims’ in order to tackle extreme Islamist ideology. For Gove, 
engaging with the ‘moderate’ Muslim would broaden the debate ‘beyond the agenda of the most 
theologically conservative and politically militant [Muslims]’. As Back et. al (2002, 450) argue, ‘the 
injunction to be moderate is ultimately the precondition for inclusion within the space offered to 
minority communities’. This dichotomy between ‘moderate’ and ‘extremist’ offers Muslims a choice 
of endorsing a particular kind of (militarised) British national identity or to come under suspicion 
as ‘obscurantist and isolationist, or rejectionist, anti-West and possibly a supporter of violence and 
terrorism’ (Birt, 2006, 693).
These modes of inclusion and exclusion are useful for thinking about British Muslims who either join 
or publicly venerate the military as a way to demonstrate their British identity. As an institution at the 
centre of British life, sites of remembrance offer a symbolic and institutional apparatus for Muslims 
to exhibit their British credentials and prove they are not an enemy of the state. As we will see in 
the discourses surrounding the 2014 Centenary Commemorations, acts of remembrance frequently 
give way to discussions of Muslims using sites of memorialisation to prove their Britishness and 
steal attention away from extremists. On the other hand, opponents of the Poppy Hijab who reject 
military institutions are anxious to not be labelled an ‘extremist’ for their unorthodox position.
Militarised Multiculture
Focusing attention on the military, I will explore Vron Ware’s concept of militarised multiculture to 
understand the military’s motivations to include Muslims in the Centenary Commemorations. In 
relation to the armed forces’ recruitment of ethnic minorities, militarised multiculture helps us to 
understand how a visibly diverse army plays a key role in mediating a progressive image of British 
identity (Ware, 2012a, 256). Militarised multiculture captures the ways in which ethnic minority 
soldiers are presented by the military to the public, for example through advertisements. In this 
way, militarised multiculture speaks to a superficial form of multiculturalism where ethnic minorities 
are used in a tokenistic manner to uphold a progressive, liberal image of Britain.
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To illustrate her concept, Ware (2012a, 280) uses the example of an image in an exhibition opened 
by the Ministry of Defence in 2002, entitled, ‘We Were There’. The exhibition was intended to be a 
tribute to the contribution made to Britain’s defence by ethnic minority communities over the past 
250 years. The image that Ware draws attention to showed a British Muslim soldier ‘giving thumbs 
up to a Chinook helicopter delivering aid, explained by a caption that read: ‘Flight Lieutenant 
Sohail Khan in Pakistan where he helped with the earthquake relief effort’ (Ware, 2012a, 281). For 
Ware (2012a, 282), by celebrating how a Muslim uniformed man was ‘bringing aid to the vulnerable 
in the interests of British security’, the image suggested that ‘military service was not about fighting 
Muslim antagonists, it was about helping them’. This sort of strategic representation does work for 
militarisation in at least three ways. First, by posturing a multicultural image with a commitment 
to cultural diversity, the military is ‘repositioned in the centre of national life’ (Ware, 2012a, 279). 
Second, this process works as a recruitment strategy to attract more ethnic minorities to join the 
forces. Third, it helps to build support for unpopular foreign policies, ‘or at least allaying public 
unease at the horrific costs entailed in endless deployments’ (ibid.).
Ware also situates militarised multiculture in the context of the rise of Islamist extremism and the 
threat of British Muslims being vulnerable to radicalisation. Against this background, the recruitment 
and representation of Muslims in the military is used to counter extremist ideology and, as Ware 
(2012a, 282) asserts, ‘to manage the risk of ‘home-grown terrorism’’. As I will delineate in the 
empirical section, the memorialisation of Muslim soldiers during the Centenary Commemorations 
involved mobilising multicultural representations of the armed forces to counter extremist ideology 
in the War on Terror.
Another important feature of militarised multiculture is how this virtuous image of Britishness 
conceals the endemic nature of institutional racism inscribed in British institutions. Following public 
allegations of racist bullying and discrimination in the armed forces, since the 1990s the British 
military has been undergoing significant changes to increase the role of ethnic minorities in its ranks. 
Steps taken by the armed forces to be a more accommodating employer for ethnic minorities have 
included introducing religiously sensitive dress codes and food preparation, increasing outreach 
schemes and specialist recruitment teams that target ethnic minority communities and monitoring 
race relations activities (Basham, 2013, 113). Furthermore, in 2005 Muslim, Buddhist, Sikh and 
Hindu chaplains were appointed to provide a support network for soldiers of religious minorities.
As well as adapting to wider normative changes in society, a range of regional and domestic 
equality legislation has placed responsibilities and obligations on armed forces across the Western 
world to better represent their respective populations. These include, on a national basis, ‘The 
Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000, the Equality Act 2006, and the Equality Act 2010’, and 
regionally, ‘a number of European Union Directives in the area of E&D and human rights (Hussain 
& Ishaq, 2016, 36). Furthermore, not only does Ware point out how ethnic minorities serve as a 
strategic asset at home, but also how they are used strategically abroad. After a decade of disastrous 
military expeditions, Britain learnt that ‘a better knowledge of ‘culture’ and specifically of ‘cultural 
difference’ was an essential tool in modern warcraft’ (Ware, 2012b, 10). The deployment of Muslim 
soldiers in Afghanistan to operate as intermediaries between the military and Afghan people is a 
clear example of this (Ware, 2012a, 21-22). Indeed, the UK government would not have been able 
to conduct military operations in the War on Terror without recruiting soldiers from Commonwealth 
countries (Ware, 2012a, 280). However, despite these efforts the military has continuously been 
struggling to gain more Muslim recruits. As of 2016, there are 650 Muslims serving in the UK armed 
forces, representing only 0.33% of the armed forces as a whole (MoD, 2016). Moreover, only 42% 
of ethnic minority personnel are from the UK, with the remaining 58% coming from foreign and 
Commonwealth countries (ibid.).
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Paradoxically, institutional racism is both a motivation and an obstacle for the armed forces to 
recruit more ethnic minorities. In an important study, Hussain and Ishaq (2002) provide polling data 
on British Pakistani Muslims’ perceptions of the Armed Forces. Importantly, the authors find that 
the majority of those questioned believe institutional racism to be the main reason why Muslims 
would not join the military (Hussain & Ishaq, 2002, 604). Victoria Basham (2009a; 2013) has also 
written extensively on the issue of institutional racism in the armed forces. Through interviews with 
sexual and ethnic minorities in the military, she reveals the realities of bullying, harassment and 
discrimination in the ranks. The conclusion she draws from her fieldwork is that despite the military’s 
efforts to recruit minorities, the armed forces ‘continues to privilege white, heterosexual male ways 
of being over those of ‘others’’ (Basham 2009a, 412). This is largely because the institutional racism 
within the military is a reflection of structural racism in wider British society. Paraphrasing Cynthia 
Cockburn (1989, 217), Basham states that the armed forces’ diversity policy may ‘give disadvantaged 
groups a boost up the ladder’ but the ‘structure of that ladder and the disadvantages it entails’ 
remain in place’ (Basham 2013, 113). Against this background, it is clear what kind of work a visibly 
diverse army can play in constructing a progressive, liberal veneer for the British military.
As we have seen, Ware’s notion of militarised multiculture is useful for understanding the intentions 
of the military during the 2014 Centenary Commemorations. However, a gap in Ware’s work is 
applying militarised multiculture to sites of memorialisation. In sites of memorialisation, the role of 
memory in producing shared national experiences is crucial to processes of militarisation. Before 
turning to the empirical section, I will outline the powerful role of memory in sites of remembrance 
to complete this article’s theoretical framework. As I will discuss, memorialisation reinforces Vron 
Ware’s notion of militarised multiculture, in relation to the military’s strategic representation of 
ethnic minorities to inform a progressive sense of national identity.
Memorialisation
The role of memory in processes of militarisation is significant because of the powerful role it plays 
in forging a shared sense of national identity. Following Jay Winter (2006, 18), we can understand 
‘collective memories’ as powerful social constructions: key to the formation of identities, both 
personal and national. In sites of remembrance, a sense of ‘collective memory’ is created ‘when 
collectives come together to recall significant events, events which tell them who they are as a 
group’ (Winter, 2006, 154). This conceptualisation of memory is useful for understanding Britain’s 
annual remembrance commemorations which involve mutually inclusive rituals, symbols and 
stories of remembrance, subscribed to widely in British society (Mycock, 2014, 107). British 
war commemoration typically draws upon shared experiences and memories of past conflicts, 
encouraging sites of shared loss (ibid.).
According to Paul Gilroy (2005, 2006), the memories of Britain’s previous wars play a central role 
in mediating the relationship between British identity and Muslims during the War on Terror. Gilroy 
has discussed how a ‘melancholic’ memory of Britain’s lost imperial stature continues to shape 
the dominant cultural and psychological dynamics of British society. Through his notion of British 
‘postcolonial melancholia’, Gilroy explains how the UK has comes to terms with its loss of imperial 
status through an assertive and discriminatory British nationalism along racial lines. For example, 
expressions of a ‘thwarted desire for greatness, for the need to retain a place at the top table, and 
to the pleasures of punching above our weight’ are explained as aftershocks of the nation’s loss of 
Empire (Gilroy, 2006, 30). Moreover, Britain’s longing for greatness reproduces an ‘imperial impulse’ 
directed towards inferior subjects like immigrants and Muslims (Roberts, 2008, 164). Importantly, 
postcolonial melancholia diverts British culture into the ‘arid pleasures of morbid militaria’ (Gilroy, 
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2005, 434), in part, through the memorialisation of war. In contemporary negotiations of identity 
during the War on Terror, Gilroy (2006, 30) focuses our attention on how ‘a heavily filtered and 
simplified projection of plucky British struggle against Nazi Germany has been brought back into 
the centre of our embattled public culture’:
‘Why is that war celebrated as the very core of national identity by people too young to 
be touched by living memory of it? Why do all of Britain’s subsequent conflicts acquire 
irrefutable legitimacy if they can be presented as its analogs or extensions? Why has 
life in that wartime been moulded to represent the last occasion on which authentic, 
undiluted, monocultural Britons were absolutely certain as to who they were and what 
they stood for?’. 
Here, we can extract an important idea from Gilroy’s work. His notion that Britain’s subsequent 
conflicts can ‘acquire irrefutable legitimacy’ through memory of past conflicts is pertinent regarding 
the Centenary Commemorations and the War on Terror. As I will highlight, the remembrance events 
have featured discourses which attempt to universalise certain values across British military history, 
lending legitimacy to Britain’s contemporary efforts in the war against extremism and terrorism.
However, contra Gilroy, rather than presenting an ‘authentic, undiluted, monocultural’ notion of 
Britishness, the 2014 Centenary Commemorations have involved a considerable effort to shed light 
on the contribution of Muslim soldiers to Britain’s efforts during WWI. These efforts can be seen as 
attempts to mobilise ideas of Britain as a tolerant, liberal and diverse society. As Bongiorno (2014, 
97) has written, regurgitating multicultural memories of military history mobilises a pluralistic notion 
of what constitutes the defence of the nation. In this way, sites of memorialisation bring historical 
context to Ware’s notion of militarised multiculture. By stretching militarised multiculture through 
memory, the liberal image of Britain takes on timeless proportions. As a matter of comparison, 
Australia has also attempted to recover a kind of multicultural history of its armed forces in recent 
years during its version of remembrance commemorations. These efforts have focused on reviving 
the contribution ethnic minorities made to the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps during 
WWI, which has been largely neglected in history. Commenting on these attempts in Australia, 
historian John Hirst has called this mode of argument ‘contribution history’, in which a seemingly 
timeless history of multiculturalism lends validity to the contemporary situation surrounding national 
identity:
‘In its continuing search for legitimacy multiculturalism has declared itself ancient. 
Australia, it is claimed, has always been multicultural. Its population has always been 
diverse…. Its society is the summation of the ‘contributions’ made by the various ethnic 
groups which have constituted its population’ (Hirst, 2006, 68). 
In the context of Britain’s Centenary Commemorations surrounding Muslim soldiers from history, 
memorialisation strives to counter the effects of time by perpetuating ‘a static and eternal image 
of an idealized and polished past’ (Renard, 2008, 296). A timeless memory of British militarised 
multiculture ‘enshrines the past and sets it in stone’ (Renard, 2008, 303). This remaking of military 
history along multicultural lines manages to construct ‘a history that is immutable, sacred and free 
of rancour and political division, a history that can justify the existence of the nation and remain 
relatively uncontested’ (Mckenna, 2014, 167).
However, memorialisation must also be understood as a contested process. As Winter has written, 
memory today is ‘a source of fractured national, ideological, and cultural forms, forms which are 
resistant to linear reconstruction’ (Winter, 2006, 19). This contested nature of military memories 
is underlined by how sites of memorialisation can be used in different ways for different political 
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agendas. For instance, British pacifists use the annual remembrance commemorations to shed light 
on the horror, waste and tragedy of WWI to legitimise their anti-militarism stance (Winter, 2006, 287). 
Similarly, in Rwanda memorialisation has been key to contemporary methods of conflict prevention 
after the brutal civil war and genocide which tore the country apart in the early 1990s. Williams 
Nkurunziza, the Rwandan High Commissioner, claimed that memorial sites remind Rwandans of the 
‘failure’ of 1994, helping the Rwandan nation to defend itself ‘against a recurrence of genocidal 
ideology’ (quoted in McCann, 2013).
Who or what group has the greatest control over memories is important in defining dominant 
historical narratives. In the context of Britain’s remembrance commemorations it is clear that military 
preferences predominantly infuse sites of memorialisation. Notably, Mycock (2014, 101,) has linked 
the memorialisation of WWI during Britain’s 2014 Centenary Commemorations to the military’s 
desire to recruit more soldiers, arguing that the promotion of commemorative acts and patriotic 
national myths has been ‘driven by a need to justify the scale of losses in [WWI] in the name of the 
British nation… not least so that others might risk their lives in future wars’.
The construction of dominant historical narratives can subjugate alternative memories which pose 
a different story of events (Noon, 2004, 341). In other words, the rhetorical construction of memory 
can be ‘concocted at the expense of other historical narratives and to the actual detriment of 
other humans’ (Noon, 2004, 342). Moreover, Bongiorno (2014) has highlighted the danger of 
including everyone in participating in national commemorative rituals ‘if the terms of that inclusion 
remain unequal’. As he states, ‘it becomes easier to criticize as ungrateful those who remain aloof, 
and as disloyal or even dangerous those sufficiently bold to offer critique’ (Bongiorno, 2014, 96). 
These points are relevant in regards to British Muslims’ relationship to the British military and 
commemoration. In the final part of this article’s empirical section, I will give voice to Muslims who 
contest the dominant narrative instituted during the Centenary Commemorations.
The 2014 Centenary Commemorations
In this empirical section, I will explore the initiatives intended to draw positive connections between 
Muslims and the British armed forces during the 2014 Centenary Commemorations. These 
initiatives coincided with an intensification of the War on Terror including the rise of the extremist 
terrorist organisation Isil in the Middle East and the controversies surrounding young British 
Muslims travelling to fight in the Syrian civil war alongside enemy jihadists. In this context, there 
was increasing pressure on Muslims to challenge stereotypes associating them with extremism and 
to demonstrate their contribution to British society.
These sites of memorialisation reveal militarisation to be a multilayered form of power that plays 
an important role in drawing the boundaries between inclusion and exclusion in the national 
community. In order to demonstrate my argument, I will begin by looking at a statement surrounding 
the Centenary Commemorations by the head of the British army. Subsequently, statements 
supporting the memorialisation of the esteemed Muslim soldier Khudadad Khan will be reviewed. 
These examples shed light on the military’s exploitation of sites of memory to gain more recruits 
and to legitimise Britain’s campaign in the War on Terror. The combination of Vron Ware’s notion 
of militarised multiculture and the powerful role of memorialisation will be used in the analysis. 
Thereafter, I will look at the case of the Poppy Hijab. This section will be split into two parts. 
First I will explore the arguments of ‘advocates’ of the Poppy Hijab, followed by the opinions of 
‘opponents’. Both these Muslim voices reveal the multilayered and contested nature of militarism, 
the power of memorialisation in military settings and the ways in which military institutions and 
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symbols act as markers of British identity. I will also show how the coverage of the Poppy Hijab by 
the right-wing media reinforces the limited modes of belonging available to British Muslims.
As an indication of the desperate times of under-recruitment in the military, military officials have 
been candid about the use of the Centenary Commemorations to attract more Muslim soldiers. In 
an interview with the BBC (Malik, 2017) surrounding the military’s relationship to British Muslims, 
head of the British Army General Sir Nick Carter acknowledged the role of memorialisation in the 
military’s recruitment strategy. In the context of the military’s endemic recruitment difficulties during 
the War on Terror, Carter (quoted in Malik, 2017) responds to a journalist’s question asking what the 
army needs to do to recruit more British Muslim soldiers:
‘It comes back to understanding what we share in common. It comes back to understanding 
that the British Army, in support of our government’s policy [the War on Terror], stands for 
values and standards which are I think common to all of our society and particularly the 
Muslim society that we’re seeking to recruit from. I think it’s about reminding ourselves 
that we’ve got this extraordinary shared historical legacy and that’s very resonant as we 
commemorate the 100th Anniversary of the First World War where many Muslim soldiers 
lost their lives in support of what the British Army and our government was trying to do 
at that stage’.
In this quote, the role of values and memory prove to be a central component of the armed forces’ 
recruitment strategy. Indelible values associated with military power are constructed in Carter’s 
attempts to blur the boundary between recruitment and remembrance. Carter universalises 
unspecified ‘values and standards’, which underpin the government’s War on Terror, across British 
society. Moreover, he claims these values to be compatible with the apparently monolithic ‘Muslim 
society’, disregarding the ‘pluralisms, contests and dissent that exist within’ Muslim communities 
(Kapur, 2002, 217).
The memorialisation of Muslim soldiers from WWI is central to Carter’s strategy to attract more 
Muslim soldiers. He highlights how the memory of the Muslim soldiers who died during WWI can be 
re-invoked as a powerful reference point of the contribution which Muslims have made to Britain in 
the past, and therefore can make in the future. In line with Ware’s notion of militarised multiculture, 
Carter discloses the military’s strategic representation of ethnic minorities as a central part of its 
recruitment technique. In this context, however, militarised multiculture is given historical validity 
as the close relationship between Muslims and the armed forces is framed as an ‘extraordinary 
shared historical legacy’. In the words of Hirst (2006, 68), the military has declared multiculturalism 
‘ancient’. This mythology of amity between Muslims and the military distorts the vexed history of 
exclusion Muslims have suffered in Britain. Moreover, to the benefit of the military’s recruitment 
aims, such a progressive image of British-Muslim relations conceals the institutionalised racism that 
plagues the armed forces. This rhetorical strategy is indicative of Renard’s (2008, 296) conception 
of the capacity for memory to ‘stop time’: ‘[a] static and eternal image of an idealized and polished 
past’ is projected, bestowing the values of diversity and exceptionalism on British military history. 
Moreover, values underpinning the UK’s wars are constructed as essential qualities of Britishness, 
serving to legitimise both the military’s attempts to recruit more Muslim soldiers and their efforts in 
the War on Terror.
Khudadad Khan
The memory of the British Muslim soldier Khudadad Khan who served during WWI has provided 
the military with a heroic protagonist to personalise this narrative. In October 2014, army officials, 
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peers, MPs, historians and religious leaders signed a letter in The Telegraph calling for greater 
recognition of Khudadad Khan, the first Muslim to be awarded the Victoria Cross (the highest 
accolade of the UK’s honours system) in 1914. This letter was written on the same day as the 
Minister for Communities led formal tributes to Khudadad Khan. And on the following year, on 
the 6th March 2015, MP Eric Pickles presided over the laying of a memorial paving stone for the 
soldier’s sacrifice. The supporting actors in these various sites of memorialisation eulogised Khan’s 
service to the nation by retelling the Muslim soldier’s bravery and heroism on the Western Front. 
For example, in the letter written in The Telegraph, it begins with the story of Khan’s courageous 
activities on the battlefield: 
‘As the line was pushed back, the machine gunner, badly wounded and massively 
outnumbered, held off the German advance long enough for Indian and British 
reinforcements to arrive and prevent the enemy making the final breakthrough. He was 
the sole survivor of his team’ (Dannatt et. al, 2014).
Supportive statements surrounding Khan’s memorialisation underscore the multi-layered processes 
of militarisation infusing these sites of memory. For instance, returning to the letter of support for 
Khan’s memorialisation, according to the writers the sacrifice of Muslims for the nation must be 
recollected in order for contemporary multiculturalism to be realised:
‘It is important today that all of our children know this shared history of contribution 
and sacrifice if we are to understand fully the multi-ethnic Britain that we are today. The 
gallant Sepoy Khan embodies that history’ (Dannatt et. al, 2014).
Again, ‘the shared history of contribution and sacrifice’ is mobilised, evidencing militarised 
multiculture through memorialisation. The Muslim identity of Khan is used as a reminder of Britain’s 
history of accepting and promoting diversity in the ‘on-going battle of Britishness’ (Ware, 2012a, 
279). In this way, the memorialisation of Khan is used to characterise Britain’s attachment to 
multiculturalism as a historical and ongoing commitment. Both Britain’s troubled history of domination 
and exploitation which typify the colonial experience for many ethnic minorities (Bongiorno, 2014), 
and the contemporary circumstances of marginalisation of Muslims in the UK during the War on 
Terror, are washed over. Through memory, Britain’s military and its wars accumulate an eternal 
image of progressive diversity and causal justness.
Importantly, the memory of Khan’s heroism has also been used in support of the government’s 
fight against Islamist extremism. Against the backdrop of young British Muslims leaving to fight for 
extremist groups like Isil in the Middle East, Muslim academic and one of the signatories of the letter 
in The Telegraph Dilwar Hussain (quoted in Malnick, 2014) explains how Khan’s memorialisation can 
be useful to counter extremist ideology.
‘the quiet dignity of our commemoration of Khudadad Khan’s bravery and service is 
perhaps the most powerful riposte we could possibly send to the sickening extremism of 
Isil’ (Hussain quoted in Malnick, 2014).  
Memorialisation in this context serves to transport Khan’s heroic soldiering from the Western Front 
to the febrile streets of contemporary Britain where young British Muslims are turning over to enemy 
lines. Effectively, Khan is transfigured into a symbolic recruiting sergeant for the contemporary 
armed forces. As Ware has written, his memory is mobilised to ‘manage the threat at home’ (Ware, 
2012a, 282). A wider point can also be made here in relation to the legitimacy of the War on Terror. 
By recollecting the memory Khan’s heroism, an essential national spirit is mobilised in favour of 
Britain’s contemporary efforts in the War on Terror. The twin notions of diversity and just cause are 
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tactfully laced through Britain’s military history, attaching ‘irrefutable legitimacy’ (Gilroy, 2006, 30) 
to Britain’s contemporary ‘good’ versus ‘evil’ fight against Islamist extremism.
Intriguingly, in this comment Hussain also makes use of the atmosphere of respect and peacefulness 
(‘the quiet dignity’) inherent to Remembrance settings as a rhetorical device to counter the 
‘sickening extremism’ of Isil. Consequently, not only is the memory itself useful, but the very act and 
performance of memorialisation is weaponised to counter extremist ideology. In this example of 
militarisation through memorialisation, the threat of extremism is countered and the War on Terror 
is refuelled.
The Poppy Hijab
The interactions between militarism and the boundaries of British identity are elucidated most 
forcefully in the case of the Poppy Hijab. These interactions shed new light on the complex ways in 
which militarisation processes work through sites of remembrance. Before exploring the coverage 
in the right-wing media and the opinions of opponents to the initiative, I will begin my analysis by 
focusing on the advocates of the Poppy Hijab.
Advocates
By listening to advocate Muslim voices the deeply complex and multilayered nature of military power 
is revealed. In an environment of suspicion and hostility surrounding Muslims, these British Muslims 
have been drawing on military institutions and symbols during the Centenary Commemoration 
to authenticate their British identity and prove that not all Muslims are extremists. For advocates, 
the Poppy Hijab provides Muslims with a symbol to disrupt and break free from stereotyping 
narratives that question their contribution to British society. As Maxwell (2006, 738) has written, 
the ‘acceptance of national symbols, institutions, and tangible involvement and investment in the 
community’ are powerful forms of political and civic participation that will increase the likelihood of 
minority communities identifying with the nation. In other words, the Poppy Hijab offers alienated 
Muslims a powerful tool to assert their Britishness.
Tabinda-Kauser Ishaq, the Muslim arts student, who worked with British Future and the Islamic 
Society of Britain to design the Poppy Hijab endorsed the message behind the garment to challenge 
notions of ‘self-segregating’ Muslims who do not want to take part in ‘normal’ British society:
‘It’s to send out the message that Muslims do care about Remembrance Day and it’s to 
tackle a lot of the misconceptions that are out there. There’s a lot of misconceptions that 
Muslims don’t commemorate those that we lost at war and we really want to tackle that’ 
(quoted in Ahmad, 2014). 
Moreover, Ishaq (quoted in British First, 2014) validates the idea that the armed forces are the 
epicentre of British identity and endorses the Poppy Hijab as an embodiment of multiculturalism:
‘It’s a simple way to say that you’re proudly British and proudly Muslim’. 
In similar terms, the British military’s official Imam, Asim Hafiz outlines how the Poppy Hijab provides 
Muslims with a symbol of national identity. His approval of the clothing is justified by its potential 
to destabilise extremist narratives – propounded by both the far-right of British politics and radical 
Islamists – which claim Islam and British culture are incompatible:
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‘[T]o ensure that [Muslims are] not tarnished with an unfavourable brush, it’s only right 
that we do as much as we can... that we raise awareness that the vast majority of Muslims 
just want to get on with their everyday life, that we’re just as British everyone else. We 
need to shut out radicals and extremists on all sides of the divide, so that they are a 
minority and they are no longer heard’ (Hafiz quoted in Sommers, 2014).
 In these examples, the shifting boundaries of inclusion and exclusion are overlapping with processes 
of militarisation. In the UK, ‘one can’t draw sharp lines any more between military and other types 
of power’ (Selby quoted in Stavrianakis & Selby, 2012, 65). These advocates reinforce the idea that 
military institutions are the ‘index of true Britishness’ (Qureshi, 2013, 402). Consequently, from a 
critical perspective it is important to pay close attention to these processes of militarisation and 
question whether alternative modes of identity are in danger of being marginalised through the 
Poppy Hijab.
Sughra Ahmed, president of the Islamic Society of Great Britain, has been a main proponent of the 
Poppy Hijab. In her comments in the media, she has been more forthcoming about refiguring the 
Muslim identity to counterbalance disproportionate coverage apportioned to Islamist extremists. 
However, Ahmed’s comment demonstrates how easy it is for these supportive discourses of the 
Poppy Hijab to slip from revering Muslims’ contributions to British society to reinforcing processes 
of militarisation. Moreover, in her support for militarised forms of multiculturalism Ahmed (quoted 
in Doyle, 2014) leans to sidelining different kinds of engagement with British society:
‘It’s also a way for ordinary Muslim citizens to take some attention away from extremists 
who seem to grab the headlines…. This symbol of quiet remembrance is the face of 
everyday British Islam – not the angry minority who spout hatred and offend everyone’.
This statement does work for militarism in two ways. First, by constructing a false dichotomy between 
extremists and ‘ordinary’ Muslim citizens, Ahmed reinforces the limited identities available to British 
Muslims constructed during the War on Terror. Second, by saying Remembrance ‘is the face of 
everyday British Islam’, other forms of British and Muslim identity, such as opposition to militarism, 
are struck out of existence.
Memorialisation has also been key for supporters of the Poppy Hijab. Advocates have been keen 
to draw connections between the Muslim soldiers of WWI and British Muslims today. For example, 
Sugra Ahmed (quoted in Doyle, 2014) has insisted on connecting the Poppy Hijab initiative to the 
memorialisation of Khudadad Khan:
‘We’re launching this today as it’s exactly 100 years since the first Muslim soldier was 
awarded the Victoria Cross for bravery – Khudadad Khan from Pakistan, who was fighting 
for Britain on the Western Front in the First World War’. 
Along similar lines, one anonymous model of the Poppy Hijab connects her and other models’ 
support for the Poppy Hijab with her reverence for the sacrifice of Muslim soldiers from the past. She 
is mindful of the Islamophobic context in which the events have gained significance, highlighting the 
ways in which the Poppy Hijab can challenge perceptions that Muslims are antithetical to Britishness. 
Again, in this comment, sites of memorialisation reveal the ways in which military institutions patrol 
the parameters of national identity: 
‘This whole anti-Muslim feeling that everybody has, I think it would be a really good way 
of Muslims showing that we are British, we are proud of everything that Muslims have 
done and contributed to the war’ (quoted in Ahmad, 2014).
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The role of memorialisation is important here in regards to Muslims and British identity. By identifying 
with the Muslim soldiers who came before her, the anonymous model conflates the identities of 
the Muslims who served Britain during WWI with Muslim identities in contemporary British society. 
Muslim contributions to Britain are framed as a linear progression, from military sacrifice to acts of 
Remembrance. Memorialisation, in this context, lends legitimacy to the models’ claims to Britishness 
and refashions Britain’s military history as a benign sort of multiculturalism. Accordingly, advocates 
of the Poppy Hijab are simultaneously declaring multiculturalism ‘ancient’ (Hirst, 2006, 68) whilst 
performing it as a perennial feature of British society. Furthermore, the military garners an enduring 
progressive image, reinforcing militarised multiculture through sites of memorialisation.
Despite these advocates’ positive attitudes, the Poppy Hijab has been contentious for some British 
Muslims. In the final section below, the multilayered and complex characteristics of militarism are 
further revealed. This opposition to the Poppy Hijab sheds light on alternative forms of British 
identity which reject military institutions. However, the anxiety amongst some of the opponents 
of being associated with ‘extremism’ for rejecting the Poppy Hijab illustrates the boundaries of 
inclusion and exclusion in processes of militarisation.
Before turning to the voices of opposition to the Poppy Hijab, it is worth shedding light on the 
coverage of the events by the right-wing media. This coverage reinforces the limited modes of 
belonging available to British Muslims and helps us to gain a sense of how some of the opponents 
perceived the initiative. The Daily Mail and The Telegraph have played a central role in promoting the 
Poppy Hijab (Doyle, 2014; Sanghani, 2015). Due to their history of demonizing Muslims in Britain, it 
may appear puzzling for this section of the press to highlight positive contributions made by British 
Muslims to society. However, as Ware (2012a, 279) states, anyone who shows affiliation with the 
armed forces is ‘qualified to sit at the high table of patriotism, as long as they [are] supervised by 
their hosts who [are] renowned for condemning anything that smack[s] of multiculturalism’.
The language used by the papers in their coverage of the Poppy Hijab is also revealing. In their 
headlines publicising the Poppy Hijab, the press belie an implicit tone of pressuring rather than of 
acceptance of Muslims’ contributions to the Centenary Commemorations. The Daily Mail (Doyle, 
2014, emphasis added) promoted the headdress with the headline: ‘The Poppy Hijab that Defies 
the Extremists: British Muslims Urged to Wear Headscarf as Symbol of Remembrance’. Similarly, 
The Telegraph’s (Sanghani 2015, emphasis added) coverage of the Poppy Hijab ran with the 
headline: ‘Why British Muslims Need a ‘Poppy Hijab’ to Remember World War One’. The uses of 
the words ‘urged’ and ‘need’ in these headlines suggest that Muslims should or are required to 
wear the Poppy Hijab in order to show they are not a threat to British society. This sort of coverage 
reiterates the pressure on Muslims to demonstrate their British values. Moreover, as some of the 
opponents suggest, it also exposes the Poppy Hijab as a proxy for reinforcing Muslims’ exclusion 
under militarisation.
Opponents
The opponents of the Poppy Hijab have expressed their discontent with the garment via statements 
and opinion pieces in the media. In their rejection of the Poppy Hijab, these Muslims are contesting 
two layers of power operating under processes of militarisation. In the context of the Muslim as the 
enemy ‘Other’, Muslims who reject military symbols are not only denying a particular configuration 
of Britishness, but also risk falling into the trap of being labelled an extremist. Their opposition can 
be perceived, at best, as being at odds with British society, and at worst, as Islamist extremism. As 
Allen (2014) has written, the Poppy Hijab is a ‘shrouded loyalty test’: ‘[n]ot only do Muslims have to 
prove they’re not the enemy but so too that they’re not a traitor either’ (Allen, 2014). Consequently, 
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other important forms of political engagement with British identity, such as opposition to war, can 
be suppressed and vilified.
Writing in the British newspaper The Independent, British Muslim Sofia Ahmed (2015) angrily 
rejected the Poppy Hijab in an article titled, ‘No, I Won’t Wear the “Poppy Hijab” to Prove I’m 
Not a Muslim extremist’. Rather than a powerful multicultural symbol, the Poppy Hijab represents 
a marketing tool for the British military that puts pressure exclusively on Muslims to demonstrate 
their allegiance to the nation. As she states:
‘No other religious group is pressured to prove their allegiance in the same way. Somehow 
I don’t think we’ll be seeing a budding Jewish designer marketing a poppy kippa anytime 
soon’ (Ahmed, 2015). 
In a similar vein, Faeeza Vaid, executive director of the Muslim Women’s Network UK, questions 
why it is specifically Muslim women who are expected to demonstrate their British credentials:
‘The idea is to show that we all care about the same things, but why is the burden 
on Muslim women to prove that sense of shared identity? We wouldn’t expect…  Sikh 
men to wear poppy turbans. If you look at it like that it is just ludicrous’ (Vaid quoted in 
Hooper, 2014).
For some, the positive coverage by the right-wing media exposes the Poppy Hijab as a test of 
allegiance to the nation. Raising scepticism over the initiative’s association with elements of Britain’s 
right-wing press, Faeeza Vaid casts doubt over the particular formation of British identity offered 
by the Poppy Hijab, viewing it as a tool for assimilation rather than multiculturalism. Vaid claims the 
Poppy Hijab provides a way for Muslims to be incorporated into Britishness, but on the condition of 
conformance to some predetermined criteria. In this way, the Poppy Hijab does not offer Muslims 
a conduit for inclusion into the nation; rather, it reinforces Muslims’ exclusion from British society:
‘The fact that it is being promoted by the likes of the Daily Mail, part of the thinking is, 
‘Okay, you are a little bit British but not British enough. We will accept you, but on our 
terms’’ (Vaid quoted in Hooper, 2014).
Opponents of the Poppy Hijab also shed light on the marginalisation of alternative modes of 
British Muslim identity under militarisation. Sofia Ahmed affirms that her decision to not wear the 
poppy is a rejection of militarism. She perceives the Poppy Hijab as part of a wider militarisation 
strategy to garner Muslim support for the War on Terror. As she writes, the Poppy Hijab is ‘nothing 
but a cynical PR campaign to co-opt Muslim opposition to aggressive foreign policy’. However, 
in her piece, Ahmed expresses anxiety that without buying the Poppy Hijab, she risks being 
labelled an extremist. Here, she tries to dissociate her anti-militarism stance from being conflated 
with extremism, revealing the shifting boundaries of inclusion and exclusion under processes of 
militarisation. Moreover, she highlights what she perceives as the racial undertows pervading British 
society through the exclusive attention on judging Muslim behaviour:
‘Refusing to wear the poppy is not an ‘extremist Muslim’ stance; it’s an ideological position 
based on anti-war sentiment. Nobody would accuse a white person of extremism for 
refusing to wear one’ (Ahmed, 2015)
To reinforce the point, Ahmed focuses our attention on occasions of racial profiling and anti-Muslim 
hatred that she has suffered. These experiences are clear examples of everyday forms of inclusion 
and exclusion constructed under processes of militarisation. Her contention is that the Poppy Hijab 
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might be able to provide her with an emblem to better represent herself as non-threatening to 
society:
‘Admittedly, I almost thought I should buy one - because it might make walking through 
security checks at airports a little easier. I could get on a train without being accosted by 
a fully uniformed soldier, drunkenly telling me he joined the army to “kill dirty Muslims”’ 
(Ahmed, 2015).
The role of memory is also important to Ahmed’s contestation of military power. In this final quote, 
Ahmed challenges the military’s attempts to construct and weave values of diversity and tolerance 
through British history. She uses her grandfather’s experiences of UK race-relations since the end 
of the British Empire. Before emigrating from India to Britain, Ahmed’s grandfather was ‘one of 
the 2.5 million Indian men’ to fight for Britain during the Second World War. Despite his service 
to the nation, Ahmed cites the racial hatred her grandfather suffered after he returned to Britain, 
because of discourses propounded by far-right politicians and political organisations. In similar 
ways to antecedent speakers, Ahmed lends historical legitimacy to her argument by unifying her 
experiences of Islamophobia with her grandfather’s experiences of discrimination. Her conclusion 
that Muslims have suffered racist abuse throughout the 20th Century stands to counter the positive 
narrative of British diversity and tolerance constructed during the Centenary Commemorations. 
‘Confronted with the memorial laziness of collective memory, or with the oppressive force of official 
memory’, opponents of the military’s narrative such as Ahmed reclaim their own version of history 
‘which is concealed in the official and collective versions’ of events (Renard, 2008, 299). In this way, 
Ahmed is disrupting the dominant historical narrative laid down by military authorities:
‘Only a few decades after the war, this man, who survived bombings, ground invasions and 
prison camps for the sake of Britain, arrived on these shores to be met with racial hostility 
and discrimination that he would have to endure until he went to his grave. He lived in the 
UK through the speech by Enoch Powell, and groups like the National Front telling him 
to ‘go back where he came from”. The sad fact is that our forefathers laid down their lives 
for this country and they were rewarded with nothing but humiliation and degradation. 
Things haven’t changed much, the rise of Islamophobia means their grandchildren and 
great grandchildren suffer new hues of abuse and negative stereotyping’ (Ahmed, 2014).
In summary, opponents of the Poppy Hijab have demonstrated that militarism is an exclusionary 
form of power that garners support for war. War is supported through the recruitment of new 
soldiers and the attachment of certain values associated with progressiveness to the armed forces. 
However, in the last example, Sofia Ahmed uses history to her own advantage. The memory of her 
grandfather’s discrimination in Britain coupled with her own experiences sends ruptures through 
the dominant historical narrative of British exceptionalism promoted during the 2014 Centenary 
Commemorations. 
Conclusion
This article has argued that the 2014 Centenary Commemorations in Britain represent complex, 
multi-layered forms of militarisation that garner support for war and reveal the shifting boundaries 
of inclusion and exclusion in the national community. Specifically, this article focused on the efforts 
by army officials, peers, politicians, academics, religious leaders and supportive British Muslims to 
include Muslims from the past and present in these events. The analysis throughout this article was 
informed by critical literature in relation to militarisation and memorialisation.
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At the beginning of the first section, insights from critical military studies illustrated how the 
boundaries and patterns of British society were drawn along military lines during the War on Terror. 
It was important to emphasise militarisation as an exclusionary process in these circumstances. 
The construction of the Muslim as the ‘Other’ was shown to be integral to the consolidation of 
Britain’s militarised identity. A narrative that relied upon racial and cultural stereotyping of Muslims 
fed into processes of militarisation and facilitated discriminatory security measures. Thus, by 
tracing the footsteps of military power, we can find some answers as to why and how categories 
of people become the enemy ‘Other’ in times of war. Moreover, the exclusionary effects of these 
militarisation processes revealed the limited modes of identity available to Muslims under processes 
of militarisation.
In the third sub-section, I sketched out the strengths of Vron Ware’s concept, militarised multiculture, 
as a conceptual tool to understand and explain the relationship between the military and ethnic 
minorities. The strengths of Ware’s concept lie in its encapsulation of the many complex issues 
surrounding ethnic minorities and the military under the broad categories of militarisation and 
multiculture. However, this article recognised a gap in Ware’s work in connection to sites and processes 
of memorialisation. Thus, an important contribution of this article was to draw together Vron Ware’s 
concept of militarised multiculture with literature concerned with processes of memorialisation in 
nations with complex, multicultural histories. By combining the literature on the memorialisation 
of multiculture with militarised multiculture, this article indicated how processes of militarisation 
can be reinforced through sites of memorialisation. Importantly, by allowing these different bodies 
of academic literature to speak to each other, this paper provides an excellent starting point for 
further lines of research concerned with the relationship between militarisation, memorialisation 
and multiculture. Indeed, such research will be essential in the coming years as the Centenary 
Commemorations will come to some sort of culmination in 2018. The manner in which these, and 
other, sites of remembrance continue to operate in the UK and elsewhere should hopefully be the 
source of much academic intrigue.
The blurring between sites of memorialisation and processes of militarisation was brought to light 
by the armed forces’ explicit intentions to use the remembrance commemorations to recruit more 
British Muslim soldiers. This article elucidated how the memorialisation of Muslim soldiers from 
WWI played into and strengthened processes of militarisation. For the armed forces, the revival 
of the historical legacy of a multicultural military served to legitimise the military’s image and their 
contemporary efforts in the War on Terror. Furthermore, the memorialisation of the heroic Muslim 
soldier Khudadad Khan was shown to be a form of mobilisation to counter extremist ideology in 
the War on Terror.
At the same time, this article analysed statements made by a number of contemporary British 
Muslims who have either been supportive of the initiatives or have explicitly opposed them. For 
participant British Muslims, commemorative activities provide an opportunity to validate their British 
credentials in an atmosphere where their identity is constantly called into question. To legitimise their 
claims to British identity, advocates of the Poppy Hijab constructed the military-Muslim relationship 
in the UK as a harmonious bond that stretches throughout history. This revealed the ways in which 
military power and processes of memorialisation interact with the contours of British identity. It has 
been important to note how the military has benefited from initiatives such as the Poppy Hijab, 
also. The Poppy Hijab works to reproduce militarism in everyday settings. The military stands to 
gain from these processes as allegations of institutional racism are obscured behind a veneer of 
a visibly diverse army. Revealingly, the right-wing media’s pressuring style of reporting confirmed 
the limited forms of inclusion available to Muslims in military settings. Furthermore, it was noted 
how alternative forms of identity can be at risk of being marginalised under militarisation. All in 
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all, this demonstrates the complex ways in which processes of militarisation, memorialisation and 
multiculturalism overlap through banal acts of remembrance.
On the other hand, this article shed new light on the opponents of the Poppy Hijab. These actors 
contest militarism by rejecting the Poppy Hijab and by posing alternative historical accounts 
of British multiculturalism. For them, the Poppy Hijab is a marketing tool for the armed forces, 
reducing multiculturalism to banal acts of militarism. The limited available modes of identity to 
Muslims in the War on Terror were illuminated through the opponents’ attempts to disentangle 
their opposition to militarism from allegations of ‘extremism’. However, by advancing an alternative 
story of racial discrimination and anti-Muslim hatred in Britain, some Muslims have challenged 
the official narratives of the Centenary Commemorations. According to this paper, through the 
description of her grandfather’s experiences, Sofia Ahmed (2014) is doing two important things 
in this regard. First, in similar ways to critical analysts, she is seeking ‘to return historical memory 
to its proper place, as one dimension of an ongoing social struggle over the meaning of the past’ 
(Noon, 2004, 342). Second, her counter-narrative disrupts the military’s portrayal of history, thus 
undermining the legitimacy of their attempts to gain more recruits and garner support for war.
The complexity of the relationship between Muslims and the British military means there is ample 
potential for further lines of research on this topic. One strong possibility is for the application of 
critical security studies. As this article demonstrated, security measures were central to the exclusion 
of Muslims during the War on Terror. Moreover, through a critical military studies lens this article 
perceived Muslims’ use of military institutions to prove they are non-threatening to society as banal 
acts of militarisation. However, from a critical security studies standpoint, these activities could 
also be observed as ‘de-securitising’ moves through militarisation, or even as ‘acts of resistance to 
banal securitisation’ (Kinnvall & Nesbitt-Larking, 2013, 358). These are just some preliminary ideas, 
exemplifying the great potential for these events to be located at the intersection between critical 
military studies and critical security studies.
Another possibility for research is in regard to the Poppy Hijab, which is well disposed for further 
semiotic analysis. My argument around the opposition to the headdress claimed that Muslims 
who reject the Poppy Hijab were in contestation with two layers of power under processes of 
militarisation. These layers of power referred to how opponents risked denying a particular 
configuration of Britishness, but were also vulnerable to being labelled an extremist. Yet, there are 
also important gender politics flowing through this initiative that situates Muslim women at the 
epicentre of the fight against radicalism and extremism (Allen, 2014). More critical analysis intent 
on deconstructing the multiple layers of power behind the Poppy Hijab would be fruitful, especially 
as the hijab continues to be at the heart of political controversy in the UK and other Western liberal 
democracies.
One limitation of this article is that the main source for the Muslim voices has been from the media. 
Without undermining the importance of the statements made in these settings, more research 
involving interviews with Muslim participants would be rewarding. Interviews could allow interested 
scholars to gain a better understanding of Muslims’ relationship with the armed forces. This would 
give voice to more British Muslim citizens, whose voices and identities have been severely restricted 
since the onset of the War on Terror. My final section on the voices of opposition to the Poppy 
Hijab has sought to listen to, and think critically about, some of the alternative modes of British 
Muslim identity that have been sidelined under processes of militarisation. The intention has been 
to illustrate how military institutions and processes of militarisation are constantly evolving, never 
fully resolved and should always be open to question.
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